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Part I
Introduction

A Chief and Court in Transition:
The Wagner Court and the
Constitution
Professor Jamie Cameron*

I. INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2017, and after little more than five years as a
puisne judge, Richard Wagner became Canada’s 18th Chief Justice.1
Only William Ritchie and Bora Laskin rose to office more expeditiously.2
When appointed, Wagner J. was less well known than Beverley
McLachlin, who served 10 years on the Court before becoming Chief
Justice.3 Between 1989 and 2000, she was a vigorous jurist, writing
frequently and at times fearlessly. In part because her jurisprudence
moved unpredictably between liberal and conservative outcomes, her
decisions were much discussed, if imperfectly understood. By contrast,
those commenting on Wagner J.’s appointment were hard pressed to cite
a body of work, and focused instead on his reputation as a collegial, fairminded, and hardworking member of the Court.4
*
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I thank my colleagues, Benjamin L. Berger, Sonia
Lawrence and Emily Kidd White, for inviting me to deliver the annual review at the Constitutional
Cases 2018 conference. I also thank and acknowledge Mr. Ryan Ng (JD 2021), for his invaluable
research assistance, and especially for his charts on the 2018 constitutional jurisprudence.
1
The same day, Martin J. was sworn in as a puisne judge of the Supreme Court of Canada,
and 2018 was also her first calendar year on the Court.
2
Justice William Ritchie was appointed a puisne judge of the Supreme Court on
September 30, 1875 and named Canada’s 2nd Chief Justice on January 11, 1879, about 40 months
later; Bora Laskin J. was appointed to the Court on March 19, 1970 and became the 14th Chief
Justice about 43 months later, on December 27, 1973. Richard Wagner was appointed on October 5,
2012 and named Chief Justice about 60 months later.
3
Justice McLachlin arrived at the Court on March 30, 1989 and was appointed Chief
Justice on January 7, 2000.
4
See, e.g., E. Raymer, “Opening the Supreme Court”, Canadian Lawyer (12 November
2018), online: <https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/author/elizabeth-raymer/opening-the-supremecourt-16456/>.
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An incoming chief justice will often speak of his goals and aspirations
for the Court, and Richard Wagner was no different. Not long after he
identified transparency and a positive image for the Court as core
priorities, the Supreme Court’s first online Annual Report was published
in February 2019, and other initiatives have followed.5 Apart from
matters of image, the Chief Justice has said little about the Court itself,
and that is why his comments on the role of dissent stand out.
The McLachlin Court’s legacy and former Chief Justice’s style of
leadership form the backdrop. Consensus and collegiality were her goals
when Beverley McLachlin was appointed to the office, and throughout her
tenure as Chief Justice. By her own account, she placed a premium on
reaching the widest consensus available, indefatigably promoting internal
discussion among the justices to minimize zones and points of disagreement.6
From the outset, Wagner C.J.C. distanced himself from that practice, seeming
to suggest an alternative path for his Court. As he explained, “I like dissent”
because “it’s normal in an open society”.7 Noting that robust dissent is “more
transparent”, he added that “I would be worried if we were always
unanimous.”8 In his view, as long as a dissent explains a legal position “with
civility”, it is “a good thing”.9 On reflection, such remarks might simply
5

See, e.g., J. Ivison, “Canada’s new chief justice keen to drag Supreme Court into the light”,
National Post (22 June 2018), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/john-ivison-chief-justicekeen-to-drag-supreme-court-into-the-light>. For the Annual Report, see Supreme Court of Canada, “Year
in Review 2018”, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/review-revue/2018/index-eng.aspx>. Another of Chief
Justice Wagner’s initiatives is the “Cases in Brief”, which are short summaries of SCC decisions “drafted
in reader-friendly language, so that anyone interested can learn about the decisions that affect their lives”.
These summaries are for members of the public; they are not part of the Court’s reasons and “are not for
use in legal proceedings”: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/cb/index-eng.aspx>.
6
This feature of the McLachlin Court is much discussed; see, e.g., J. Tibbetts, “Building
Consensus”, Canadian Lawyer (July 2013), at 24-31; see also I. Greene and P. McCormick, chapter 7,
“Dissident in Search of Consensus”, Beverley McLachlin: The Legacy of a Chief Justice (Toronto:
James Lorimer & Co. Ltd., 2019) at 131-48.
7
J. Ivison, “Canada’s new chief justice keen to drag Supreme Court into the light”,
National Post (June 22, 2018), online: <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/john-ivison-chiefjustice-keen-to-drag-supreme-court-into-the-light>.
8
A. Wherry, “Chief Justice says Supreme Court can be powerful voice for rule of law
amid global tumult”, CBC News (22 June 2018), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/richardwagner-supreme-court-1.4717678>; and T. MacCharles, “Canada’s top judge says Canada should
provide leadership at a time when fundamental values are being undermined in the world”, Toronto
Star (22 June 2018), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/06/22/canadas-top-judgesays-supreme-court-should-provide-leadership-at-a-time-when-fundamental-values-are-beingundermined-in-the-world.html>.
9
A. Wherry, “Chief Justice says Supreme Court can be powerful voice for rule of law
amid global tumult”, CBC News (22 June 2018), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/richardwagner-supreme-court-1.4717678/>.
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represent answers to questions he was asked. Yet the Chief Justice might have
been signalling his respect for difference, acknowledging the realities of
collegial decision-making, flagging his own style of leadership, or — in all
modesty — voicing and accepting limits on his power as Chief Justice.
One Chief Justice’s departure and another’s arrival plainly mark an
important transition for any apex court.10 The Chief Justice is notoriously but
paradoxically primus inter pares or “first among equals”, with some over the
ages more intent on their status as “primus” and others defining their role, more
collegially, as chief “inter pares”. One of the mysteries of any institutional
history is how a Chief Justice exercises authority and how leadership styles
shape a court, institutionally and juristically.11 Ironically, McLachlin C.J.C.
could not have achieved the consensus that defined her Court without
exercising strong — albeit tactful — skills as first among equals.12
Over time, the Wagner Court will be shaped and even buffeted by
variables and fortuities that defy prediction. If it is unwise to read too
much into its inaugural jurisprudence, 2018 unmistakenly documents a
rise — as the chief justice predicted and seemed to invite — of division
and even of fracturing within the Court. Less invested in praise or
dismay at the turn away from consensus, this analysis instead seeks
insight into the dynamics and fault lines on the Wagner Court.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL METRICS
1. 2018: A Quantitative Glimpse
By now, the annual review has become a standard, offering a handy
measure of quantitative and qualitative perspectives on the Supreme
Court’s work each year.13 Beyond the informational, the dynamics on the
10

For interest, see L. Greenhouse, “How Not to be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of
William H. Rehnquist”, 154:6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365 (2006) (describing outgoing Chief Justice Burger
as a failed leader and negative example for his successor, William H. Rehnquist).
11
F. Cross & S. Lindquist, “Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice: The
Decisional Influence of the Chief Justice”, 154:6 U Pa L Rev 1665 (2006) (attributing the ebbing of
consensus and surge in dissenting and concurring opinions on the U.S. Supreme Court to the
“leadership style and ability” of 1940s Chief Justice Stone. Id., at 1681).
12
See generally E. Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379.
13
See, e.g., Supreme Court of Canada, “Year in Review 2018”, online: <https://www.scccsc.ca/review-revue/2018/index-eng.aspx>; N. Novac, B. Fox, & N. Parker, “2018 at the Court: A Year in
Review”, theCourt.ca (February 19, 2019), online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2018-scc-a-year-in-review/>;
.
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fledgling Wagner Court are the quarry and concern of this review.
Descriptively, the year featured a relatively modest docket of 59 cases, of
which 13, or close to one quarter, directly involved the Constitution and
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.14 Of those, four, or almost one-third,
concerned the Constitution, including questions about the 1867 text,
parliamentary privilege, unwritten principles, and Aboriginal rights.15
The Court’s nine Charter decisions were grounded in section 2’s
fundamental freedoms (3), the legal rights (4), and section 15’s equality
guarantee (2).16 The constitutional claim succeeded in five instances
while failing in eight others.17
A breakdown shows the structure of decision-making in 2018. The
2017 McLachlin Court is in the foreground, counting unanimity in seven
of 14 constitutional cases, or half its decisions.18 To compare, the Wagner
Court was unanimous and anonymous twice, in two non-Charter

J. Carpay, J. Kitchen, & D. Hersey, “The 2019 Judicial Freedom Index”, Justice Centre for
Constitutional Freedoms (May 2019), online: <https://www.jccf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
Judicial-Freedom-Index-2019.pdf?mc_cid=8e78150e3f&mc_eid=8bdfd2ad9c>.
14
The cases are: R. v. G.T.D., [2018] S.C.J. No. 7, 2018 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“GTD”]; R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, 2018 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Comeau”];
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des
services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “APTS”]; Centrale des
syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “CSQ”]; Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Ewert”]; Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018
SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU BC”]; Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, 2018 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU ON”]; Chagnon v. Syndicat
de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] S.C.J. No. 39, 2018 SCC 39 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Chagnon”]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council),
[2018] S.C.J. No. 40, 2018 SCC 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree”]; Reference re Pan
Canadian Securities Regulation, [2018] S.C.J. No. 48, 2018 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Securities Reference”]; R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc, [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Vice Media”]; R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Reeves”]; R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Boudreault”].
15
Comeau; Chagnon; Mikisew Cree; Securities Reference; id.
16
On s. 2, see TWU (BC and Ontario) and Vice Media; on legal rights, see GTD; Ewert;
Reeves; Boudreault; and Vice Media (ss. 8 and 2(b)); on equality rights, see APTS and CSQ, id.
17
The claim succeeded in GTD (s. 10(b)); APTS (s. 15, pay equity); Securities Reference
(division of powers); Reeves (s. 8, search and seizure); and Boudreault (s. 12, cruel and unusual
punishment). The claim failed in Comeau (s. 121, free trade); Chagnon (no parliamentary privilege);
CSQ (s. 15, pay equity); Ewert (s. 7); TWU (BC and Ontario); Mikisew Cree (no duty to consult in
legislative process); and Vice Media (s. 8).
18
There were 19 constitutional decisions in 2017, with written reasons in 14 cases and oral
decisions in the remaining five. L. Sossin, “Constitutional Cases 2017: An Overview” (2019) 88
S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 4.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE WAGNER COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

7

decisions, and unanimous three other times, but only as to outcome.19
2018’s constitutional jurisprudence comprised eight majority opinions,
along with 12 concurrences and seven dissents, yielding 19 sets of
parallel reasons in 12 cases with written opinions.20 The pattern of
multiple opinions is fortified in other high profile cases that evoked
constitutional considerations without directly engaging the Charter.21 If
it is early to suggest a shift, the metrics confirm that the space for
consensus, which was a hallmark of the McLachlin years, shrunk visibly
and dramatically in 2018. Moreover, the consolidation of high-impact
decision-making by Côté, Brown, and Rowe JJ., writing on their own
and in combination, was easily the most striking development this year.
These hardworking, intellectually restless, and uncompromising judges
wrote 13 opinions in all, not one of which was a majority opinion.22
2. A Year of Not Enough and Too Much
2018 was the year that oral reasons, a long-time standard of Supreme
Court decision-making, provoked backlash. Following a pattern that
dates back to 2014, the Court delivered summary reasons from the bench
in an increasing number of cases.23 Dismissing appeals without written
reasons occurs for the most part, but not exclusively, in criminal cases
19
Comeau and the Securities Reference were unanimous and anonymous decisions; though
unanimous as to result the Court generated six sets of concurring reasons in Mikisew Cree; Vice
Media; and Reeves.
20
The majority opinions are: APTS; Ewert; TWU (2); Chagnon; Reeves; Vice Media; and
Boudreault. The concurrences are: CSQ (1); TWU (x4, BC & ON); Chagnon (1); Mikisew Cree (3);
Vice Media (1); and Reeves (2). Neither CSQ nor Mikisew Cree generated a majority opinion; Côté
J.’s reasons in CSQ count here as a plurality concurrence. GTD was decided by oral reasons and is
not included in this tabulation. Dissents were filed in APTS; CSQ; Ewert (partial); TWU (BC & ON);
Chagnon; and Boudreault; Brown J.’s summary reasons in GTD explain briefly that Wagner C.J.C.
dissented from the majority.
21
See, e.g., Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development), [2018] S.C.J. No. 4, 2018 SCC 4 (S.C.C.) (5-2-2); Groia v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 27, 2018 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) (5-1-3); Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 28, 2018 SCC 28 (S.C.C.) (3-1-1-1-3).
22
Justice Brown’s oral reasons in GTD are technically a majority opinion but are not
considered further. For the same reason, GTD is not part of the Court’s 12 written reasons in
constitutional cases in 2018.
23
Between 2007 and 2013 the Court’s average for oral reasons, at 5.4 per year, was low.
That number rose between 2014 and 2017 to reach an average of 16.75 reasons from the bench per
year. See A. Goldenberg, “R. v. G.T.D.: The Court decides a case from the bench — again”,
McCarthy Tetrault (March 5, 2018), online: <https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/canadianappeals-monitor/r-v-gtd-supreme-court-canada-decides-charter-case-bench-again>.
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that reach the Court as of right. In 2018, the Court rendered oral
reasons18 times, representing close to 30 per cent of its docket. Even
when the panel divided, which occurred five times in 2018 and once
under the Charter, the Court was content with cursory reasons that did
little but identify the dissenting judge or judges by name.24 Put another
way, the numbers confirm that the Court provided written reasons 41
times, in about 70 per cent of the cases on its 2018 docket.
The premise of by-right appeals is that the apex court should hear a
Criminal Code matter when there is a dissent at the provincial appellate
level. Although the assumption is open to question, the Supreme Court’s
management of these appeals — sitting in panels of five and rendering
summary oral reasons — “leaves the impression” that these cases are the
docket’s “second class citizens”.25 In more pointed terms, the “practice of
deciding cases with only a few words of explanation … calls into question
the Court’s commitment to transparency”, and defies its own rule that
“[r]easoned decisions [are] inherent in the judge’s role”.26 An approach to
by-right appeals that strikes some observers as disrespectful may in due
course affect the Court’s legitimacy: the integrity of its jurisprudence is less
a function of outcome than of reasons that explain the disposition to parties
and attend to the law’s development. Moreover, on a downsized caseload,
resources are not the issue; it is difficult to imagine that providing reasons
in some of these cases would burden the Court.
In contrast to the summary dismissal of these appeals is the prolixity
of written reasons in 2018’s constitutional decisions: while oral
judgments in 18 decisions totalled 48 paragraphs, or less than three
paragraphs per decision, the Court’s output in 12 constitutional cases
expanded to a monumental 1935 paragraphs, or on average, about 161
paragraphs per decision.27
24
See R. v. G.T.D., [2018] S.C.J. No. 7, 2018 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) (Wagner C.J., dissenting);
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), Local 773 v. Lawrence, [2018] S.C.J. No. 11,
2018 SCC 11 (S.C.C.) (Abella J., dissenting); R.A. v. the Queen, [2018] S.C.J. No. 13, 2018 SCC 13
(S.C.C.) (Gascon J., dissenting); R. v. Cain, [2018] S.C.J. No. 20, 2018 SCC 20 (S.C.C.) (Côté J.,
dissenting); R. v. Culotta, [2018] S.C.J. No. 59, 2018 SCC 59 (S.C.C.) (Abella and Martin JJ., dissenting).
International Brotherhood, ibid., is a relatively rare example of summary dismissal of a civil appeal.
25
C. Schmitz, “SCC’s growing number of oral judgments draws bar’s fire but court says
appeals get ‘all the attention and resources they require’”, The Lawyer’s Daily (December 20, 2018),
online (quoting Nader Hasan): <https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/9310>.
26
F. Addario & J. Foy, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s ‘new transparency’ is anything but”,
The Globe & Mail (December 16, 2018), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-thesupreme-court-of-canadas-new-transparency-is-anything-but/> and id. (quoting Binnie J.).
27
See Appendix, R. Ng, “Quantitative Analysis of 2018 SCC Decisions”.
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On numerics alone, the weight and composition of this jurisprudence
is significant. 2018’s eight majority opinions accounted for 646
paragraphs, or about one-third of the volume; including 2018’s two
unanimous opinions elevates that number to 906 paragraphs, which is
still less than half the year’s total. Meanwhile, the Court’s 12
concurrences and seven dissents comprised 920 paragraphs, or more than
half the output.28 In other words, majority reasons were outweighed by
minority opinions, comprising concurrences and dissents, both in number
and volume. As a matter of interest, 2017’s comparables show a lower
total of 1442 paragraphs, of which 937 — about two-thirds — were
unanimous or majority opinions.29 In addition, the 2017 McLachlin Court
wrote four concurrences and six dissents, totalling 445 paragraphs, or
less than one-third of the volume of reasons.30 Put simply, a quick
comparison with 2017 confirms a downward shift this year in the nature
and degree of consensus in constitutional decision-making.
Five members of the Wagner Court wrote a majority opinion in 2018:
Karakatsanis J. led with two majority opinions and one plurality; Abella
J. followed with one majority opinion and one plurality; Wagner C.J.C.,
and Moldaver and Martin JJ. each wrote one majority opinion.31 None of
the others — Gascon, Côté, Brown, or Rowe JJ. — wrote a majority
opinion on a constitutional issue in 2018. Voting but once for the claim in
R. v. Reeves, Rowe J.’s support for the Charter was lowest among
members of the Court.32 Gascon J., who on April 15, 2019 announced his
retirement from the Court, wrote no reasons in the 2018 constitutional
jurisprudence, and placed himself on the side of the majority in every
instance.33
28
Including the Côté J. plurality in CSQ, concurrences contributed 533 and the dissents 387
paragraphs, to reach this total. Adding Abella J.’s lead plurality reasons in CSQ (56 paragraphs) and
Karakatsanis J.’s reasons in Mikisew Cree (53 paragraphs) brings the number to 1935 paragraphs.
29
R. Ng, “Quantitative Analysis of 2017 SCC Decisions” (on file with author).
30
There, the concurrences totalled 124 paragraphs and the dissents 321 paragraphs. R. Ng,
“Quantitative Analysis of 2017 SCC Decisions”.
31
For Karakatsanis J., see Chagnon, Reeves, and Mikisew Cree (plurality opinion). Justice
Abella’s majority opinion was APTS and her plurality opinion was CSQ. While Wagner C.J.C. wrote
the majority opinion in Ewert, Moldaver J. wrote in Vice Media, and Martin J. wrote the majority
opinion in Boudreault.
32
While the others supported the Charter claim three times, with four votes, Brown J. was
the Charter’s strongest supporter in 2018 (TWU (2); Reeves; Boudreault).
33
Statement from the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada: <https://www.
newswire.ca/news-releases/statement-from-the-minister-of-justice-and-attorney-general-of-canada-onthe-retirement-of-supreme-court-justice-clement-gascon-830188149.html>. In May 2019, Gascon J.
released a public statement acknowledging the mental health challenges he has suffered over the years.
.
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While at six paragraphs McLachlin C.J.C.’s CSQ dissent was the
shortest minority opinion, Rowe J.’s 107-paragraph concurrence in TWU
(BC) was the longest.34 Apart from Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.,
McLachlin C.J.C. was the only other member of the Court to write a
dissent.35 Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. each contributed two
concurring opinions and Moldaver J. added another, with Côté, Brown,
and Rowe JJ. providing the remaining seven.36
Whether in a threesome, as a pair, or alone, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
wrote 13 of the Court’s 19 minority opinions.37 This, it bears noting,
is about 70 per cent of the yield, and at 722 of the Court’s 1675
paragraphs, about 40 per cent of its non-unanimous volume. It is clear,
on this measure alone, that these judges formed a powerhouse of
significant strategic, jurisprudential, and institutional strength and
intensity. As discussed below, this is not only a function of volume or
paragraph counting; the Côté-Brown-Rowe jurisprudence exposed
significant differences of opinion within the Court, and at times
expressed flashes of attitude in doing so.
3. 2018’s Qualitative Metrics
Others can attest that the Court’s 1935 paragraphs of written
constitutional reasons challenge the most intrepid, astute, and tireless of
readers. In a volume that has been published annually since 2001,
Constitutional Cases 2018 once again offers insightful commentary on
the year’s jurisprudence by prominent scholars, freeing this review to
explore institutional themes and issues. A few observations are offered
here, in overview and as prelude to a closer examination of the rise in
minority reasons in 2018.

S. Fine, “Supreme Court Justice Gascon releases a statement on his health after his disappearance”, The
Globe & Mail (May 14, 2019), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-supremecourt-justice-gascon-releases-statement-on-his-health-after/>.
34
At four paragraphs, her concurrence in TWU (Ontario) was shorter but simply confirmed
her reasons in TWU (BC).
35
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.).
36
While McLachlin C.J.C. concurred in the two TWU cases, Abella J. wrote full-length
concurrences in Mikisew Cree and Vice Media Moldaver J. wrote a concurrence in Reeves.
37
In 2017, these judges wrote three concurrences and three dissents. R. Ng, “Quantitative
Analysis of 2017 SCC Decisions” (on file with author).
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By tally, Charter claims succeeded in four of nine cases, including
G.T.D., and failed in five others.38 Section 2’s fundamental freedoms
account for three of the five losses and were not supported by the Court in
2018.39 Meanwhile, the Charter’s legal rights generated five decisions,
including Vice Media, with the section 8 claim prevailing untidily in
Reeves and with significant impact for section 12 in Boudreault.40 Finally,
the Court split the pay equity decisions from Quebec, finding in APTS that
legislative amendments to the scheme unjustifiably violated section 15 in
APTS, and dismissing the claim in CSQ, where the lack of a comparator
workforce justified delays in implementation of the scheme.41
Freedom-based claims did not fare well in 2018, and that includes the
high profile decision in R. v. Comeau, which resurfaced the 1867
Constitution’s “free trade” clause.42 This was not the first constitutional
dispute about Canadian beer, and in Comeau the section 121 issue set up
against long-standing interprovincial trade barriers, and grievances about
fairness and equity between citizens and businesses of different
provinces.43 Despite a chronic lack of will to address this problem at the
level of politics, the Court in solidarity rejected the invitation to mobilize
section 121.44 The prospect of opening up free trade litigation and
encouraging laissez-faire claims against complex regulatory schemes

38
The claim succeeded in GTD (s. 10(b)); APTS (s. 15, pay equity); Securities Reference
(division of powers); Reeves (s. 8, search and seizure); and Boudreault (s. 12, cruel and unusual
punishment). The claim failed in Comeau (s. 121, free trade); Chagnon (no parliamentary privilege);
CSQ (s. 15, pay equity); Ewert (s. 7); TWU (BC and ON); Mikisew Cree (no duty to consult in
legislative process); and Vice Media (s. 8).
39
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.); Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 33, 2018 SCC 33 (S.C.C.); R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53
(S.C.C.).
40
R. v. G.T.D., [2018] S.C.J. No. 7, 2018 SCC 7 (S.C.C.); Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 30, 2018 SCC 30 (S.C.C.); Vice Media; R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56
(S.C.C.); R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58 (S.C.C.).
41
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “APTS”].
42
R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, 2018 SCC 15 (S.C.C.). The issue was whether a
regulation prohibiting individuals from having, keeping, or “stocking” out-of-province beer and
alcohol violated the Constitution’s free trade clause.
43
See Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (AG), [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 914 (S.C.C.).
44
Section 121 reads: “All Articles of Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the
Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces”.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (U.K.).
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was, in the Court’s perception, fraught with consequences.45
Constraining, if not effectively pre-empting, a role for section 121
preserved the status quo of routing complaints about regulation through
the Constitution’s section 91 and 92 checklists.46
The Wagner Court’s responses to the Charter’s fundamental freedoms
also disappointed. Long-awaited decisions on law society accreditation of
TWU’s proposed law school culminated in a 5-1-1-2 split in the Court.47 In
four sets of reasons, members of the Court staked and defended strong
positions, but failed to engage with the concept of freedom in any
meaningful way. Writing on her own, McLachlin C.J.C. voiced a strong
view of breach, concluding that the parallel violations of expressive and
associational freedom escalated the interference with TWU’s section 2
rights.48 The majority and Rowe J., comprising six of nine judges,
subsumed the coordinate claims in section 2(a), leaving unresolved the
question whether and in what circumstances a compound violation of
section 2 might aggravate a breach and condition the justification analysis.
The majority opinion did not name its author, which suggests a
composite of views or author(s) who chose not to be known. In principle,
the battle lines between the majority and dissent formed around the scope
of public interest regulation by the law societies and contested
understandings of diversity. In cerebral terms, the opinions paid scant
attention to freedom’s requirements, and none advanced a theory of
freedom. After 342 paragraphs, the Court’s longest constitutional decision
in 2018 yielded scarce insight on freedom of religion, expression, or
association. Freedom under section 2 remained as much a situational
entitlement as before, contingent on and subject to the vagaries of context
and the uncertain contours of subjectively derived Charter values.49
45
R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, 2018 SCC 15, at para. 3 (S.C.C.) (stating that the
potential reach of s. 121 is “vast”, implicating agricultural supply management schemes, public healthdriven prohibitions, environmental controls, and “innumerable comparable regulatory measures”).
46
Rather than invoke the language of laissez faire, the Court pointed to “constitutional
hiatuses” under ss. 91 and 92 that would arise if s. 121 served as a textual mechanism of economic
integration. Id., at para. 72.
47
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.); Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 33, 2018 SCC 33 (S.C.C.). The majority comprised Abella, Karakatsanis, Moldaver, Gascon JJ.
and Wagner C.J.C.; McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. wrote sole concurrences, and Côté and Brown JJ.
wrote a joint dissent.
48
McLachlin C.J.C., the only member of the 2018 Court who also heard it, cited to, and on
this point followed TWU BC.
49
For further discussion, see infra.
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In Vice Media, section 8 served as the host for section 2(b) concerns
and the claim also failed there, by a 9-0 vote.50 Justice Abella nonetheless
wrote important concurring reasons, discussed below, urging the Court to
find a breach of section 2(b) whenever police search the press. Despite
invoking customary platitudes about a free press and tweaking the
Lessard framework, Moldaver J.’s majority opinion refused to accept that
a search of the press engages section 2(b). By reading freedom of the
press into section 8 as a marker of reasonableness, Vice Media effectively
read the freedom down — or out — of the Charter; in doing so, the Court
once again rebuffed section 2(b)’s textual guarantee of press rights.51
Elsewhere, Charter claims succeeded impressively, if somewhat
unusually, under sections 12 and 15. As mentioned, APTS held that
amendments to Quebec’s pay equity scheme unjustifiably violated
equality, and was offset by CSQ, which found that the lengthy delay in
access to pay equity in non-comparator workplaces did not offend the
Charter.52 APTS and CSQ provoked a joint dissent and plurality
concurrence, both of which rejected the claim without finding a breach of
section 15.53
This left R. v. Boudreault as the one Charter decision that bristles with
possibility.54 There, Martin J.’s debut Charter opinion held that the
Criminal Code’s mandatory victim surcharge violated section 12’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. As a form of
mandatory minimum, the surcharge was within the doctrinal compass of
the Court’s jurisprudence invalidating such measures.55 Still, the
punishment was a relatively modest fine and not the prospect of custodial
or carceral punishment.56 The extenuating circumstances of marginalized
criminal defendants and departure from long-standing principles of
50

R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (S.C.C.).
In this context, the framework was set in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard,
[1991] S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (AG), [1991] S.C.J.
No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (S.C.C.).
52
CSQ concerned the s. 15 status of pay equity in workplaces without male comparators,
and the lengthy delay in access to pay equity for employees in those workplaces.
53
For further discussion, see infra.
54
R. v. Boudreault, [2018] S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Boudreault”].
55
Most notably, see R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.).
56
While Martin J. maintained that offenders subject to the surcharge could be imprisoned
for non-payment, Côté J. stated, to the contrary, that impecunious offenders would never be
imprisoned for non-payment; Boudreault, at paras. 69-73, 137. In dissent, Côté J. also noted that a
surcharge of $100 or $200 for each conviction “is not exorbitant in and of itself”. Boudreault, at
para. 152.
51
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sentencing, particularly proportionality, led the Court to invalidate the
surcharge, and do so without the customary suspended declaration.57 It
remains to be seen whether Boudreault is context-specific, or instead
points section 12 toward broader conceptual boundaries and an enlarged
function.
The intellectual energy of the Wagner Court’s 2018 constitutional
jurisprudence may be its defining feature. Rigorous analysis in
concurring and dissenting opinions exposed transparent and significant
differences of opinion among members of the Court. It is as though a
dynamic of engaged debate released or unblocked the institution from
years of the McLachlin Court’s ethic of consensus building.

III. TRANSPARENTIZING DIFFERENCE
If a quest for consensus might sandpaper the “rough edges” from
opinions, blurring or obfuscating the tensions at work, a multiplicity of
“unnecessary” views can evoke the “narcissism of small differences”,
potentially triggering destabilizing internal dynamics.58 The balance of
agreement and disagreement on any apex court is necessarily fluid —
organically re-calibrating with shifts in the court’s composition,
leadership, and docket. Supreme Court of Canada judges hold office as
individuals and serve as members of a decision-making collective
responsible for the enforcement and development of Canadian law. When
a jurist’s point of view does not align with majority sentiment, a decision
to concur or dissent is inflected by considerations of strategy and timing,
as well as by a conception of judicial duty, integrity, and conscience.
Minority reasons are a deliberate choice by a jurist who is compelled in
the circumstances to present an alternative point of view.

57
As Martin J. explained, a suspended declaration “would simply cause more offenders to
be subject to cruel and unusual punishment” and place the presiding court “in the position of having
to affirm the very elements of the law that render it cruel and unusual”. Boudreault, at paras. 98,
106.
58
K. Makin, “Justice Binnie’s Exit Interview”, The Globe & Mail, September 23, 2011,
online at: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/justice-ian-binnies-exit-interview/article
555452/>. (describing “by the court” decisions as a process of “sandpapering the rough edges, taking
out the little flashes of colour and reducing it to a vanilla flavour”). The “small” or “minor” differences
quote references a Freudian concept — with many applications — and describes the psychological
phenomenon of small or smaller differences being inflated or exaggerated to the point of assuming large
and larger dimensions, out of proportion to their importance.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE WAGNER COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

15

Concurring and dissenting reasons are the register of disagreement, on
reasons for decision as well as on disposition of an appeal.59 While dissent
speaks directly to the fact of disagreement, concurrences are far from
monolithic. Modestly, a concurrence may detach its author from an aspect
of majority reasons, propose an angle on doctrine, or hold an issue in
place, declining to comment or decide.60 Likewise, concurring opinions
may accept an outcome but not agree with reasons that for one reason or
another are uncomfortable to endorse.61 Concurrences can have ambitious
purposes, such as staking out an alternative approach or sending a
doctrinal trial balloon up for consideration and debate. In courting support
within the Court or appealing prospectively to law’s evolution, this form of
concurrence aims for impact.62 At their strongest, concurrences may be
indistinguishable from full-fledged dissent, expressing little more than
baseline agreement with a majority outcome.63
The Wagner Court’s minority opinions are rich and dense, in substance,
style, and intensity, presenting a vital counterpoint to the views of the
majority. Though the 19 concurrences and dissents run the gamut from
relatively short to relatively long, each brought a point of principle to the
fore that — in the author’s opinion — could not be submerged or sidelined
by majority reasons. Chief Justice McLachlin’s CSQ dissent and Rowe J.’s
concurrence in Chagnon v. SFPQ provide examples that fall at the more
modest end of the spectrum.64 While a short, six-paragraph dissent in CSQ
sufficed to record the former Chief Justice’s view, curtly, that the section
15 claim should succeed, Rowe J.’s 17-paragraph concurrence in Chagnon
was strategic. That appeal tested whether security guards at Quebec’s
59

Peter McCormick is one of the leading scholars on these issues. See, e.g., “Blocs,
Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada”
(2004) 42 O.H.L.J. 99; “The Choral Court: Separate Concurrence and the McLachlin Court, 20002004” (year), 37 Ottawa Law Review 370; “Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence and the Modern
Supreme Court of Canada, 1984-2006” (2008) 53:1 McGill Law Journal 137. See also, E. Macfarlane,
“Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379;
V. MacDonnell, “Justice Suzanne Côté’s Reputation as a Dissenter on the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47.
60
Vice Media and Reeves provide an example of the reverse, where the majority resisted the
challenge, set out in concurring reasons, to enlarge the scope of decision-making.
61
In 2018, Rowe J. concurred in Chagnon because it was unnecessary to engage the
constitutional contours of privilege.
62
The Abella J. concurrence in Vice Media, discussed below, is an example.
63
Justice Côté’s concurring reasons in CSQ and to some extent in Reeves are in this
tradition.
64
Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, [2018] S.C.J.
No. 39, 2018 SCC 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chagnon”].
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National Assembly could be dismissed by presidential fiat, as an aspect of
parliamentary privilege, or were protected by the statutory labour scheme
for public servants. Justice Rowe’s sole concurrence offered a workaround that resolved the matter against privilege, albeit on statutory
grounds.65 Downplaying the stakes in that way was not of interest to
majority and minority opinions that expressed divergent views on the
scope and merits of parliamentary privilege.
More generally, 2018’s minority reasons can be sorted according to
conventional criteria of form and content. On content, Wagner Court
judges unwilling to accept prescribed doctrine or align with majority
positions wrote concurring opinions at key junctures, in the process
ambitiously challenging or proposing modifications to Charter
methodology. Engagement at this level of jurisprudential debate is found
in Vice Media, Reeves, and TWU.
As for form, the style of discourse also shifted, bringing a harder, more
transparent edge to disagreement in at least some cases. As already noted,
Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. worked as a juristic tag team of sorts, combining
and re-combining to create synergies as decision-making required. The
three wrote sharply in TWU, jointly and severally, in concurrence and in
dissent.66 Elsewhere, the tone escalated, arguably crossing the line of
collegiality in argumentative reasons that might be perceived by some as
confrontational and even disrespectful. The joint dissent signed by the three
judges in APTS and Brown J.’s concurrence in Mikisew Cree introduced an
edge to collegial discourse that stood out in 2018. This edge contributed as
much to institutional dynamics as the content of minority reasons.
1. Concurring and Dissenting Differences in Principle
In Vice Media, the Court’s sympathy was in short supply and there
was never a doubt that the claim would fail on the merits.67 Despite the
65
He maintained that the statutory regime for National Assembly employees ousted any
privilege, the President could claim to dismiss security guards. In his view, it was unnecessary for the
legislature to explicitly abrogate the privilege and its failure to do so meant that the security guards
remained in the purview of the statute and outside any powers of dismissal the President might enjoy.
66
Despite disagreeing as to outcome, the Rowe concurrence and joint dissent by Côté and
Brown JJ. provided a complementary and stinging critique of Doré methodology; see discussion, infra.
67
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (S.C.C.). After a selfproclaimed terrorist sought access to the media to advance and glorify his cause, Vice Media and
journalist Ben Makuch challenged the constitutionality of production orders directing them to
produce the screen captures of messages exchanged with the source.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE WAGNER COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

17

context, Abella J. wrote a concurring opinion fiercely advocating a
constitutional concept of the press. Pushing back against long-standing
precedent, she maintained that a dual analysis is mandatory because
section 2(b) and section 8 are both violated when the press is subject to
search or a production order.68 Justice Abella’s reasons appealed to the
“distinct” constitutional status of the press more than a dozen times,
heralded the vital democratic role of the press, and called for a “new
harmonized analysis” whenever police seek access to journalists, their
documents, and their sources.69 A concurrence advocating so
emphatically for — constitutional press rights — calling on the Court to
overcome its “prior judicial hesitancy” and “openly acknowledge that
freedom of the press is not a derivative right” — was not only
unexpected but extraordinary; it led to a 5-4 vote and might have come
close to winning majority support.70
Were it not for the concurrence, the Court’s reasons in Vice Media could
have been quite short, and that is why the majority opinion should be read
against Abella J.’s opinion.71 Justice Moldaver’s reasons were firm on the
constitutional issue, declaring it “inappropriate and unnecessary” to address
the Charter, because Vice Media could be decided “without going so far as
to rethink s. 2(b)”.72 Justice Moldaver emphasized that the matter was not
“fully argued”, and furthermore urged caution, pointing to the “unforeseen
consequences” that recognizing a constitutional free press could have on
other areas of the law.73 What surprises, in light of this, is that Moldaver J.
wrote at such length and so carefully to modify the Lessard search warrant
criteria and tailor the Garofoli test to the circumstances of the press. Despite
68

Vice Media, at para. 112 (stating, for example, that both the media’s s. 2(b) rights and s. 8
privacy rights are engaged when the state seeks access to information, and a “rigorously protective
harmonized analysis is therefore required”).
69
For references to the distinct and independent role of the press, see paras. 122, 123, 125,
126, 133, 141; additionally, the hallmarks of her harmonized approach are that s. 2(b) is no longer
the “backdrop” in determining the constitutionality of production orders; that both media
entitlements must be balanced against the state’s interest; and that a proportionality analysis of
salutary benefits and deleterious consequences must be added. Vice Media, at paras. 141-145.
70
Vice Media, at para. 123.
71
Though it is unclear, the structure of the decision suggests that the concurrence could
have preceded majority reasons; while Moldaver J. defers to her summary of the facts and history,
and responds specifically to her proposal, Abella J. unusually does not acknowledge or comment on
the majority opinion at all.
72
Vice Media, at para. 105.
73
Vice Media, at para. 103 [emphasis added]. But note that counsel for Vice Media and
other intervenors did ask the Court to revise and modify the rules around press searches and
production orders.
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his view of section 2(b) and the merits of the claim, he made notable
concessions to the press and media.74 This raises the interesting question
whether Moldaver J. would have volunteered these modifications in any
event, absent the concurrence. Rather than leave Abella J.’s forceful opinion
and proposal for a dual analysis unanswered, he might have concluded that
the law would be better served by yielding doctrinal ground to the press. In
this way, Moldaver J. provided a corrective within the existing framework
and fortified it at the same time.75
From that perspective and on its face, R. v. Reeves presents an
interesting contrast. There, the majority opinion’s decision not to address
a key issue prompted sole concurrences by Moldaver and Côté JJ. Once
again, all members of the Court agreed — in this instance — to exclude
illegally obtained evidence under section 24(2).76 The judges otherwise
divided on the section 8 implications of police entry to shared
accommodation and seizure of a shared computer. Justice Karakatsanis
relied on a concession by counsel to assume legal entry, and focus instead
on the legality of seizing a computer co-owned by common-law
spouses.77 In doing so, she stolidly maintained that it was unnecessary
and inappropriate for the Court to address the question of entry.78 In spite
of her position, Moldaver J. wrote a concurrence giving the issue full
consideration, and advancing a test based on the Waterfield framework for
common law powers of arrest.79 He broached the tentative nature of his
proposal in an unusually transparent and modest way, perhaps signalling
a measure of ambivalence or discomfort in addressing the issue.80
Whether by design or not, the Moldaver concurrence provided
74

Specifically, Moldaver J. “reorganized” the Lessard factors to make them easier to apply
in practice and proposed a modified Garofoli standard to allow de novo review of a production
order, but only where information is presented to the reviewing judge, which was not before the
authorizing judge and could reasonably have affected the decision to grant the order. Id,. at paras.
82-83 (Lessard) and paras. 72-76 (modified Garofoli standard).
75
Jusices Moldaver and Abella both acknowledged and were well aware of critical changes
in the law recently effected by enactment of the Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c.
22. The Court heard its first appeal under this legislation in Denis c. Côté.
76
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.). In brief, the police entered a
home, with the consent and at the invitation of the accused’s common-law partner, and seized a
shared computer.
77
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.), at para. 20.
78
Reeves, at para. 23 (stating that it was not “prudent” to explore the issue in the absence of
full submissions).
79
The common law police power he proposed has five criteria. Reeves, at para. 96.
80
See, e.g., paras. 71, 76, 100 (stating, in para. 76, that “any final determination” must be
left “for another day”).
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counterweight to Côté J., whose energetic concurrence was more
definitive than tentative, and read much like a dissent.81
When a concurrence surfaces in the decision-making process, the
majority opinion must choose whether and how to respond. In many
cases, the reasons may be mature and the majority committed at that
point in the process, as perhaps in Reeves. Engaging after the fact might
appear defensive and can entangle the majority in an agenda not of its
choosing, potentially compromising the clarity or cohesion of its reasons.
At the same time, leaving a gap can lend authority to a concurrence that
proposes an alternative approach that is not tested by any response,
positive or negative. Members of the Court have been known to boost the
authority of concurring and dissenting opinions by commenting and
relying on a majority’s failure to join issue or express disagreement. In
this, there is a sense of missed opportunity in Reeves with the majority’s
decision not to address what was, in a literal sense, the threshold issue of
prior legal entry. The gap in majority reasons focused attention on and
empowered the Moldaver and Côté concurrences, but in formal terms
reserved the Court’s position to another day.
Though concurring opinions in Vice Media and Reeves presented
alternative approaches to key questions under sections 2(b) and 8, TWU
provoked the most intense exchanges on issues of constitutional
interpretation. Flaws in the law society process in British Columbia and
divergent results in provincial appellate courts complicated the Court’s
task of deciding the question of accreditation for TWU’s proposed law
school.82 While the majority opinion and joint dissent focused on the core
issues at stake, concurring opinions by McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J.
diverted attention to other questions. Specifically, and after effectively
dissenting on the question of entitlement — because she disagreed with
the exclusion of section 2’s other freedoms and belittling of the violation
— McLachlin C.J.C. upheld the decision. In her view, the Law Society
could. reasonably refuse accreditation to avoid condoning TWU’s

81
She maintained, for example, that her reasons for upholding police entry were “more
compelling” than those of Moldaver J. (id., at para. 109); in addition, she provided detailed reasons
or concluding, contrary to the majority, that police validly seized the computer.
82
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU BC”]; Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper
Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, 2018 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU ON”]. The discussion
focuses on TWU (BC) as the leading decision on non-accreditation of the proposed law school.
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discriminatory covenant.83 In this way, she converted her strong reasons
on breach to weak and unpersuasive grounds of justification.84
Meanwhile, Rowe J. treated TWU as the venue for a lengthy exegesis
on the conceptual structure of Charter interpretation. In doing so, his
107-paragraph concurrence curiously worked backward from
justification to breach. Justice Rowe did not decide the preliminary issue
of breach until late in his reasons, at that point finding that nonaccreditation did not violate section 2(a)’s freedom of religion, and also
that non-accreditation met the standard of reasonableness.85 In light of
that conclusion, Rowe J.’s long passages on “the proper approach to
Charter rights” were, in formal terms, beside the point.86 It was evident
throughout that his clear priority in TWU was to position himself as an
iconoclast rethinking the foundations of Charter methodology. A specific
goal of this bold and ambitious concurrence was to confront and
challenge the Doré approach to Charter-based administrative decisionmaking.87
It was not much coincidence, in light of their affinities in 2018, that
Côté and Brown JJ. joined forces with Rowe J. on that issue. Having
pledged not to reconsider the decision, the joint dissent added its own
critique, detailing its “fundamental concerns” about the way Doré
“betrays the promise of our Constitution”.88 Through a process of
analytical counterpoint, the two minority opinions reinforced each
83
Chief Justice McLachlin maintained that the expressive and associational elements of
TWU’s claim must be included in the ambit of the s. 2(a) claim, because denial of accreditation
would limit its expression of its religious beliefs and practices, and limit its right to associate as
required by its religious beliefs and practices. Id., at paras. 122-126. That analysis led her to disagree
with other members of the Court who concluded that the interference with constitutional rights was
minor in the circumstances. Id., at para. 134.
84
Id., at para. 140. But see para. 338 (joint dissent, maintaining that there is no basis for
concern that law society accreditation would amount to condoning the content of the Covenant or
discrimination against LGBTQ persons).
85
Id., at para. 242 (concluding that s. 2(a) does not protect a right to impose religious
practices on those who do not voluntarily adhere) and para. 268 (upholding the decision as
reasonable).
86
Id., at paras. 162-208.
87
Id., at 164, stating the concern that Doré does not provide a “similarly rigorous protection
of Charter rights” as Oakes. Among other things, Rowe J. challenged the concept of Charter values
(paras. 166-175, id.) and addressed the ambiguity on burden of proof under a Doré-based approach
(paras. 195-208).
88
Id., at para. 266. In particular, Côté and Brown JJ. cited the lack of a rationale for a
distinct framework for administrative decision-making (para. 302); the majority’s reliance on
“unsourced” Charter values (paras. 306-308); its interpretation of and the weight placed on equality
as a counter-value (para. 310); and the question of onus (paras. 312-314).
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other’s central concerns about the flaws and weaknesses of the
methodology. It was a thorough job that contested the underlying
assumptions of a customized Charter standard for administrative
decisions, and then pointed to the flimsy way, in their view, that the
standard applied to the non-accreditation decision.89 In concert, the
minority reasons in TWU left the model vulnerable and shaken, perhaps
inflicting enough damage to put survival of the Doré approach in doubt.
The tipping point in TWU was the majority opinion’s decision to
uphold non-accreditation in the face of a controversial and profoundly
flawed decision-making process.90 Upholding the law society decision in
such circumstances became a flashpoint for the subjective, malleable,
and deferential elements of the methodology.91 Yet the majority opinion
did not take the doctrinal “bait” set in the minority opinions; unwilling or
unable to answer their concerns, the majority rested its case on the
strength in numbers of five votes. It is evident, following TWU, that there
is little space for consensus, and that makes a showdown on this
methodology likely in the near future.
As this brief discussion confirms, members of the Wagner Court were
simply unwilling, at critical moments, to compromise their views or
submerge their voices in majority reasons. The minority opinions in Vice
Media, Reeves and TWU — as well as in the pay equity decisions,
Chagnon, Mikisew Cree, and Boudreault — enriched, enlivened and
emboldened decision-making in 2018 in ways that were at least inventive
and at times radical.

89
See joint dissent, ibid., at para. 302 (stating that the justices “welcome the clarification”
of the framework, but “find the lack of rationale for insisting on a distinct framework for
administrative decisions troubling” [emphasis added]); and para. 294 (stating that “the majority
simply cannot point to any basis whatsoever for suggesting that the [law society] Benchers
conducted any balancing at all, let alone proportionate balancing” [emphasis in original].
90
Justice Rowe explained that if he had found a Charter infringement, he did not see “how
it would be possible for the LSBC to proceed by way of a majority vote while upholding its
responsibilities under the Charter”, adding that the law society could not achieve proportionate
balancing “simply by saying a majority of its members were in favour of denying accreditation”. Id.,
at para. 256.
91
For instance, the joint dissent objected to “the imposition of judicially preferred ‘values’ to
limit constitutionally protected rights, including the right to hold other values”, adding that the majority
“does not (and cannot) point to a specific legal rule or right to ground the application of a value of
equality”. Id., at paras. 309, 310. Also, the dissent pointed out the Court’s silence on the question of
onus, thereby “leaving a conspicuous and serious lacuna in the Doré/Loyola framework” and despite
being challenged “on this very question” by other members of the Court. Id., at para. 312.
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2. On the Edges of Difference
Chief Justice McLachlin’s consensus-building skills and strategies have
been widely praised, and her style of leadership attributed, in part, to gender
and her role as Canada’s first female Chief Justice.92 She engaged those
strategies in the service of minimizing or eliminating what she once
described as “unnecessary concurrences” and “unnecessary voices”.93 Chief
Justice McLachlin actively encouraged co-authorship as well as wrote
memos, “highlight(ing) areas where the first drafter [could] emphasize or
tone down so that he [could] bring in more voices”.94 Reportedly, she
intervened directly to defuse “unnecessarily pointed remarks” in written
opinions, at times inviting a rephrasing in “temperate terms”, of “potentially
hurtful or belittling phraseology”.95 Chief Justice McLachlin led the Court
at a time when her experience and personal strengths, together with the
Court’s composition, was amenable to a consensus-based style of decisionmaking. Even so, the suggestion that would-be concurrences or different
voices might be “unnecessary” sends a troubling message, and other
strategies hint at a heavy-handedness and top-down chill on the freedom
and independence of judges to speak and write reasons as they please.
As the turn to a more provocative approach to written reasons this year
demonstrates, the institutional dynamics have already shifted with a change
in leadership. On at least two occasions, pointed remarks appeared that might
have prompted a gentle intervention under former Chief Justice McLachlin.
In APTS, the joint dissent of Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. openly
personalized its disagreements with Abella J.’s majority opinion.96 Their
concern was that Abella J. had imposed an “obligation of result” on
Quebec that was “profoundly unfair”.97 Pointing out that it was a pioneer
in the struggle against pay inequities, the joint dissent concluded that the
92
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McLachlin: The Legacy of a Chief Justice (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co. Ltd., 2019) at 144-148;
M. Wetstein & C. Ostberg, “Strategic Leadership on the Canadian Supreme Court: Analyzing the
Transition to Chief Justice” (2005) 38:3 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 653 (tracing McLachlin C.J.C.’s transition
to leadership and her strategic effort to serve as a social leader, changing the “tone and timbre” of
the Court she leads; id., 669-70).
93
J. Tibbetts, “Building Consensus”, Canadian Lawyer (July 2013), at page 28.
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province could not be faulted under section 15 of the Charter for
modifying the implementation of a scheme that proved imperfect. The
analysis was rigorous, but also dismissive of and condescending toward
the majority opinion, variously describing Abella J.’s analysis as
“tainted”, “wrong”, “mistaken” and “absurd”.98
CSQ, the companion case to APTS, reached a different outcome on a
4-4-1 split in the Court.99 On the additional question of implementing
pay equity in non-comparator workplaces, the claim failed under both
plurality opinions, with McLachlin C.J.C. alone in dissent. While Abella
J.’s plurality found a justifiable breach of section 15, Côté J.’s once again
held that there was no violation of section 15. A key difference between
the two is that the edge in tone that characterized the joint dissent in
APTS did not repeat in CSQ. Chief Justice Wagner joined the APTS
dissenters in CSQ, on the related but separate issue about the status of
pay equity in non-comparator workplaces; whether his concurring vote
had a moderating influence on the style of discourse is unknown.100 It is
also unclear whether it made a difference that APTS was a joint dissent,
and Côté J. was sole author of the plurality concurrence in CSQ.
Otherwise, the Court’s decision in Mikisew Cree prompted strong
differences of opinion within the Court. There, the question of a duty to
consult Aboriginal communities during the legislative process generated
an unusual 3-2-1-3 split at the Court.101 What stands out in Mikisew
Cree’s profusion of reasons is the negative and even disdainful way
Brown J. spoke of Karakatsanis J. and her reasons.102 At face value, his
98
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concurrence reads as if written in pique, demonstrating one colleague’s
lack of respect for another. Though Rowe J.’s concurring opinion
expressly approved and endorsed Brown J.’s analysis, neither he nor
Moldaver and Côté JJ. — who signed his reasons — chose to join
Brown J.103 In the circumstances, it is certainly possible that these judges
set themselves apart to avoid endorsing or validating the dismissive tone
and attitude of the Brown concurrence.
Judicial independence values and requires, but also tolerates, the
prerogative of every jurist to vote and decide according to her own
dictates, and in doing so, to write reasons that are uncompromisingly her
own. It is reality — a feature and vital element of decision-making —
that differences of opinion will be strongly held and expressed. There is a
cautionary just the same. Escalating the discourse and rhetoric of an
opinion does not necessarily or even usually improve the persuasiveness
of its point of view. Moreover, when disagreements are personalized in
the opinions of the Court — which constitute its official work and point
of contact with the Canadian public and legal community — collegial
relations will be affected; in human terms, it cannot be otherwise.

IV. SUPREME COURT DNA
At his end-of-term press conference in June 2019, Wagner C.J.C.
brushed off concerns about the incidence of division in the Court’s
decision-making to date. As reported, the Court divided in 18 of its first
22 decisions this year, marking the lowest rate of unanimity in
decades.104 When invited to comment, Wagner C.J.C. cautioned of the
need to be “very careful when one looks at numbers”, and added that
dissenting opinions are in the Supreme Court of Canada’s “DNA”.105
Declaring that “I’m not afraid of that”, the Chief went on to state that
dissent is “very good, positive for our jurisprudence”: making no mistake
of the message, he added “it’s good for the debate” and “good for
transparency and openness”.106
103
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Unanimity can be overvalued and, as Wagner C.J.C. acknowledged,
can mislead, staunching and disappearing lines of disagreement to
present a false impression of consensus. Nor are patterns of agreement
and disagreement constant over time, or with changes in court leadership
and composition.107 In any event, there is no benchmark to establish
when there are too many concurrences or dissents, or reasons that are too
long, too contentious, or too beside the point. To place queries about
Wagner Court divisions in perspective, it is worth recalling an earlier
point in Charter history when the Supreme Court delivered 12
concurrences in four decisions on the same day, and another when the
Court released 18 concurrences on two consecutive days.108 At this time
the Wagner Court’s administration is one year in the making; in due
course, its decision-making data will take shape and find its place in the
longitudinal statistics for historical rates of agreement and disagreement
on the Supreme Court of Canada. The rise in minority reasons in 2018
may stand out, though perhaps only in the short term and against an
extended period of unanimity and consensus under McLachlin C.J.C.
His remarks, in 2018 and again in 2019, express the Chief Justice’s
confidence in his style of leadership. So far, Wagner C.J.C.’s conception
of office has been grounded in collegial and institutional trust,
demonstrating his willingness to place the Court in the hands of its
judges. It is an approach that is weighted more to the inter pares than the
primus side of a Chief Justice’s equation of office. In 2018, members of
the Court took the Chief Justice’s cues to heart, spilling countless words
on the page to advance debate about high-level questions of
constitutional interpretation. Three judges — Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
— dominated the minority jurisprudence, holding the majority view to
account, at times in blunt and uncompromising terms. Suffice to say, and
without naming them a bloc or faction, their reasons have had significant
impact on the style and content of debate at the Court. Yet concerns
about internal divisions that could disturb the equilibrium of collegial
decision-making are premature. It is well to remember that the Court’s
107
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nine judges are equal and accountable, at all times and in all cases, to the
law, the Court, and their own concept of judicial duty and integrity.
When a jurist’s perspective does not align with the majority view, the
issue is whether or how to reconcile that difference. For each jurist and
for the institution that process is dynamic and cannot be orchestrated.
And so, trusting his colleagues and respecting their differences, even at
the edge of civility — in the faith that the Court’s legitimacy can
withstand and even embrace all forms of concurrence and dissent — may
be Wagner C.J.C.’s most important achievement in 2018.
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